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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CHARLES S. GARLETT, REPLY BRIEF 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
-vs- Appellate Case No. 20010218-CA 
JENNIFER T. GARLETT, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PETITIONER/APPELLANT (hereinafter "Petitioner") submits the following as his 
responsive brief to the Brief of Appellee in the above matter: 
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY 
Jurisdiction to review the final judgment and order herein, which are the Decree of 
Divorce and the Order Denying the Motion to Set Aside Decree or Motion for New Trial, is 
vested in the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, Rules 
3 and 4, and Utah Code Annotated, §78-2a-3(2)(h). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING 
The matter below is a divorce proceeding, and the orders appealed from are the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce and the ruling on Motion for 
New Trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The following are the issues presented in reply: 
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A. Does the Petitioner's failure to object to the trial court's Memorandum Decision 
and its failure to object to the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law bar Petitioner from having these issues reviewed on appeal? 
B. Did the Petitioner adequately preserve the question of the adequacy of findings 
underlying the alimony award for appeal? 
C. Did the trial court err in attributing income to the Petitioner above the amount 
reflected on his tax returns and as testified at trial? 
D. Should this Court of Appeals grant the Respondent attorney's fees on appeal? 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS. CASES. STATUTES AND RULES 
There is no case law nor statutory authority believed by the Petitioner to be wholly 
dispositive of the issues raised on appeal, however, in deference to the concerns raised by the 
Respondent in her Reply Brief, the Petitioner has provided this Court with a Table of Contents 
citing various statutory rules and cases and further will reference as needed in this Reply Brief 
cases that are applicable.1 
STANDARD OF APPEAL 
Petitioner cites once again to Griffith v. Griffith, 985 P.2d 255 (Utah 1999), where the 
court stated that "in formulating alimony awards, the trial court has broad discretion, and its 
decisions will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion or manifest injustice." Further, 
1
 In the Appellees's Reply Brief, Appellee criticizes the Appellant for stating that there is 
no case law or statutory authority believed by Petitioner to be wholly dispositive on issues 
raised on appeal. Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(6) requiring citation to and 
quotation of "constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose 
interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal." While it is 
true that several cases, statutes, and rules are used by the Appellant in his Brief, the purpose 
of Appellant's statement is to indicate to this Court that there is no one case, statute, or rule 
which is wholly dispositive of the issues being appealed. Clearly, Petitioner intends to cite to 
the applicable areas of case law and statutes as needed as is evidenced by the content of this 
Reply Brief. 
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the Respondent has never stated that the Memorandum Decision drafted by the trial court and 
the subsequent Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce propounded 
by Respondent's counsel based upon this Memorandum Decision did not reflect the court's 
ruling. Moreover, it is the abusive discretion standard which the Petitioner objects to stating 
simply that the court abuse its discretion in not providing adequately detailed and supported 
findings for its decision. 
The standard of plain error mentioned by the Respondent's counsel (in citing the case 
of Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456 (Utah App. 1990), in the context mentioned by Respondent, 
there must have been some error in regard to the reasoning of the court or in the reduction to 
writing. In this context, Respondent describes something much closer to a clearly erroneous 
standard. Plain error would be something such as whether a person had been served with 
process (see Cams v. Cams, 668 P.2d 555, 557 (Utah 1983)), or whether or not a party to a 
divorce action is voluntarily underemployed for purposes of child support. See Hill v. Hill, 869 
P.2d 963, 965 (Utah App. 1994). Furthermore, the case of Christensen v. Christensen, 628 
P.2d 1297, 1301 (Utah 1981) stands for the principle that detailed findings not only 
significantly aid the appellate court in its review, but help the parties determine whether or not 
an appeal is necessary. This is because the parties can clearly determine what the court 
based its decision on and can adequately determine whether or not the court committed error 
or whether the court went beyond the bounds of its discretion. Findings that are legally 
insufficient, such as the findings in the case at bar, will allow the Appellant to have the decision 
overturned without marshaling the evidence. This is because the act of trying to marshal 
evidence where findings are legally insufficient is futile. Williamson v. Williamson, 983 P.2d 
1103, 1105 (Utah App. 1959), "we agree with Ms. Williamson that 'she need not engage in a 
futile marshaling exercise [because she] can demonstrate the findings, as framed by the court, 
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are legally insufficient,' citing Campbell v. Campbell. 896 P.2d 635, 638 (Utah App. 1995)." 
See also, Watson v. Watson. 837 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 1992); Naranio v. Naranio. 751 P.2d 
1144, 1147 (Utah App. 1989). 
Further, the trial court is granted broad discretion on ruling on a motion for relief from 
judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Birch v. Birch. 771 P.2d 
1114 (Utah App. 1989). See, generally Bovce v. Bovce. 609 P.2d 928 (Utah 1980), and Eqan 
v. Egan. 560 P.2d 704 (Utah 1977). 
In regard to motions for a new trial, a party must establish: (1) the existence of newly 
discovered evidence which is material and competent; (2) if by due diligence the existence 
could not have been discovered and produced before trial; and (3) that the evidence is merely 
cumulative or incidental, but is substantial enough that it would be evidence of a reasonable 
likelihood of a different result," the trial court should grant the motion. Hudema v. Carpenter, 
989 P.2d 491, 502 (Utah App. 1999). Clearly, the trial court in making a summary ruling that 
the motion was simply denied is insufficient, especially given that Petitioner had provided the 
court with newly discovered evidence submitted in the form of DNA result testing which could 
not have been provided at time of trial, the court's decision to deny this motion. Respondent 
did not have detailed findings or information regarding the ruling to make a determination as to 
whether or not the Court's decision to deny his motion for a new trial was, in fact, an abusive 
discretion, clearly erroneous, or arbitrary and capricious. In short, once again, if the findings 
are legally insufficient, then the Appellant need not bear the burden of marshaling the 
evidence as it would simply be futile. The Respondent acknowledges that the motion in and of 
itself preserves the issue for appeal, yet fails to state why the trial court's decision is wholly 
lacking in any findings to support its decision. Further, the Brief of Appellee states as follows: 
Mr. Garlett did not object to the trial court's Memorandum Decision entered on 
July 10, 2000, which include the trial court's first analysis of the issue (R. 59-62). 
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Nor did Mr. Garlett raise any objection to the adequacy of the trial court's 
analysis in his motion for a new trial, filed September 21, 2000, nor did he file an 
objection to the trial court's findings and conclusions, which reflects the analysis 
challenged on appeal, filed on February 21, 2001 (R. 122-124). But see Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure 52 (permitting parties to move the trial court within ten 
days of the final judgment to amend findings of make additional findings, 
permitting such a motion to be made in conjunction with the motion for a new 
trial). Brief of Appellee, at Page 3. 
The above analysis indicates that the Respondent feels that no issue can be preserved for 
appeal unless the trial court's decision is initially objected to in writing to the trial court within 
ten days, which would require every case that would come before this Court of Appeals be 
objected to initially before the trial court prior to bringing the case before the Court of Appeals. 
While this is implied by the Respondent, Respondent provides no support for this position in 
case law or statute other than to indicate that the option exists to file an objection, but fails to 
state where this is mandated by either the Rules of Civil Procedure or the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. Clearly, increase in costs of litigation time and efforts spent by a party would triple 
by requiring all cases brought before the Court of Appeals to be objected to formally and in 
writing prior to submitting the case to this court for appellate review. 
Further, had Petitioner a clear idea as to what the lower court based its decision on in 
both the Motion to Review and its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of 
Divorce, the Petitioner could have objected in a clear and concise fashion and given the trial 
court an opportunity to rule on the issue. However, it is this lack of legally sufficient findings 
upon which Petitioner must gain insight before he can object to the trial court's ruling. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from final judgment and Decree of Divorce in the Seventh Judicial 
District Court in and for Grand County, State of Utah, and an appeal from Petitioner's Motion 
for New Trial, or in the Alternative, Motion for Relief from Judgment, pursuant to Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure 60(b), the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson, presiding. Judge Anderson entered, 
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among other things, an order regarding alimony, child support and property distribution, and 
denied the Petitioner's Motion for New Trial, or in the Alternative, Motion for Relief From 
Judgment, citing as his primary reason that the Petitioner "has submitted no reply, nor any 
affidavit supporting his assertion that the evidence is newly discovered." (See Ruling on 
Motion for New Trial attached hereto as Exhibit UA" and incorporated herein). The Decree of 
Divorce from which this appeal arises was entered on or about February 23, 2001. A Notice of 
Appeal was timely filed on behalf of Petitioner on or about March 1, 2001, 
Petitioner filed for divorce in the trial court. Responsive pleadings were filed and the 
matter came on before the lower court for trial on June 27, 2000. The Court took the matter 
under advisement and entered its Memorandum Decision on July 10, 2000 (a copy of which 
has been previously submitted to this Court). The Petitioner then filed a Motion for New Trial 
on September 25, 2000. The Respondent subsequently filed a Verified Response and 
Objection to Motion for New Trial dated October 6, 2000. The Court subsequently ruled 
thereon and entered its own order on October 26, 2000. It is from the Decree of Divorce 
signed on February 23, 2001, and prior orders in the case that the Petitioner has brought his 
appeal. 
There are no motions pending in the trial court pursuant to Rule 50(a) or 50(b), 52(b), 
54(b), or 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The parties to this action were husband and wife, having been married in 1983. There 
are three minor children at issue here: Travis Charles Garlett, born January 28, 1987; Corie 
Elizabeth Garlett, born August 15, 1990; and Taylor Hallie Garlett, born May 11, 1994. The 
parties were divorced by a Decree of Divorce entered on February 23, 2001. The trial court 
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awarded the Respondent sole custody of the parties' minor children subject to the Petitioner's 
reasonable visitation pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §30-3-35 (Memorandum Decision, page 2). 
At the time of trial, the evidence presented to the trial court indicated that the 
Respondent did have a history of working various jobs. However, the Respondent had never 
worked a full-time job. No evidence was presented that would indicate that Respondent had 
any health problems that would have prevented her from working full-time, and the 
Respondent had been working part-time due to her own choice. The seasonality of her 
employment was taken into account, as well as Respondent's need to be home to care for the 
children when they were not in school. (Memorandum Decision, page 4). The trial court found 
that Petitioner's income, as reflected by his federal income tax returns from recent history, 
indicated he earned an average of $30,000.00 annually. However, the trial court found that 
Petitioner admitted to "fudging his income by $5,000.00 during at least two years from 1994 to 
1998" and, based upon the testimony of Respondent, that the family spent "$50,000.00 to 
$80,000.00" annually on personal expenses. The lower court found Petitioner was capable of 
earning at least $50,000.00 annually for purposes of calculating child support and alimony. 
(Memorandum Decision, pages 3 and 4). The trial court found, based upon the testimony and 
the evidence presented before it, the Respondent had little ability to earn more than minimum 
wage. (Memorandum Decision, page 3). This resulted in Respondent being imputed income 
of $5.15 per hour, working only 30 hours per week. (Memorandum Decision, page 4). 
The trial court made no clear findings as to the reasonable monthly living expenses for 
the Respondent, nor did the trial court articulate any clear findings as to its basis for calculating 
the original monthly living expenses for the Respondent and the minor children living with her. 
The trial court also failed to state with specificity what it determined to be the Petitioner's 
reasonable living expenses. Despite this lack of findings, however, the trial court somehow 
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found the Respondent to be in need of $2,134.50 per month to cover the expenses for herself 
and her minor children. (Memorandum Decision, page 4). Moreover, the trial court stated that 
if the children can live on $2,134.50 per month, Petitioner can live on the remains of his 
monthly income after he pays $1,650.00 per month in child support and alimony. 
(Memorandum Decision, page 5). The trial court made this determination without giving any 
indication as to how it arrived at its conclusion, nor what the court felt the Petitioner's minimal 
reasonable living and business expenses were. 
Additionally, the trial court made a ruling that the Respondent be awarded the parties' 
marital home subject to a lien of one-half (!4) of the equity value of that home in favor of 
Petitioner, to be paid to Petitioner as soon as the home was sold. The home was not to be 
sold until the youngest child in issue attains the age of 18 years or until the Respondent and 
the children move out of the house. (Memorandum Decision, pages 5 and 6). The trial court 
divided the majority of the parties' marital assets based upon what it believed to be an 
equitable or an even distribution of the dollar values of those items. However, the trial court 
divided many of the assets carte blanche indicating that they had very little value and that they 
were personal items ". . . whose value is very dependent upon their meaning to each person 
and the use each could make." (Memorandum Decision, page 6). The trial court found that 
the Respondent should be awarded virtually all the home furnishings and the Petitioner be 
awarded all the sporting goods, with the exception that the Respondent be awarded a 
computer and leased Chevrolet Suburban. The other items of significant value were a 1995 
boat and trailer with a net value of $4,000.00, a camp trailer with a net value of $6,500.00, and 
a vacant lot with a net value of $18,000.00. The boat and the trailer with the camper were 
awarded to Petitioner. The vacant lot was to be sold with the first $10,500.00 of the sale 
proceeds, after payment of any debts and the sale costs, to be paid to Respondent. The 
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balance would then be divided between the parties. (Memorandum Decision, pages 6 and 7). 
In making this award the court held that most of the items of personal property and home 
furnishings are of very little value, including many items of cabinetry and woodworking that 
were handcrafted by Petitioner, which left the Petitioner with none of the home furnishings. It 
awarded all the home furnishings to the Respondent from a marriage that lasted over 16 
years. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. The Petitioner's failure to object to the trial court's Memorandum Decision and the 
Findings of Fact do not bar raising these issues upon appeal. Further, the Petitioner's 
failure to object to the trial court's ruling on Petitioner's Motion for a New Trial and 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment does not bar raising this issue on appeal. 
2. The Petitioner adequately preserves the question of reviewing the adequacy of the 
findings of the trial court for an abusive discretion for appeal. Petitioner need only 
show that the trial court did not follow the requisite standards in creating adequate 
findings such that the parties can clearly follow the reasoning of its decision, and such 
findings being wholly inadequate, the exercise of marshaling the evidence to support 
the findings is futile and Appellant need not marshal. Furthermore, Petitioner need not 
file a written objection with the lower court to every order of that court in order to raise 
the issue on appeal. Clearly, the Petitioner preserved the issues by presenting his 
case to the trial court in support of his position. The trial court's failure to adequately 
disclose to the parties the basis for its ruling did not bar the Petitioner from questioning 
it on appeal. 
3. The trial court erred in imputing income to the Petitioner in excess of his stated income 
on his Financial Declaration and his tax returns and further abused its discretion by not 
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properly stating the basis for arriving at the Petitioner's apparently imputed income of 
$50,000.00 per year. Further, the trial court failed to fully explain for purposes of 
determining alimony what the Petitioner's reasonable expenses were or whether or not 
the $50,000.00 level of income is based upon gross or net income. The Petitioner can 
only assume that the $50,000.00 figure is based upon gross income, as gross income 
is used to determine child support. As such, the question becomes what was the 
reasonable amount of expenses that the court considered for the Petitioner, what level 
of taxes did they find agreeable to deduct from the income of Petitioner for purposes of 
determining his ability to pay alimony. However, it is the heart of Petitioner's Appeal 
that he must make the above assumptions rather than simply review a clearly written 
and supported decision of the trial court. 
The Respondent should not be awarded attorney's fees on appeal. This appeal is 
clearly meritorious. As such, no fees should be granted. At worst, the Petitioner's 
Appeal is not frivolous. Further, attorney's fees are awarded on appeal to the 
prevailing party only if that party was awarded fees at the lower court. In the case at 
bar, Respondent was not awarded any fees during time of trial, and should not be 
awarded fees on appeal, even were she to prevail. 
The trial court abused its discretion in failing to establish proper Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law to give this court a basis for its decision, in regard to child support, 
alimony and property distribution. As such, this court should remand these issues in 
favor of the Respondent and make any such remand for re-hearing consisted with this 
court's directive regarding specificity of findings. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. PETITIONER'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE TRIAL COURT'S 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND FINDINGS OF FACT, AND THE TRIAL 
COURT'S ORDER ON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND MOTION TO 
SET ASIDE JUDGMENT DOES NOT BAR RAISING THESE ISSUES 
ON APPEAL 
A. No Waiver. 
The Petitioner has not waived any right to request that the trial court's decision be 
reviewed on appeal simply by failing to object to them in writing. Any objection on the record 
would have been futile, as the case was determined by a Memorandum Decision and no in-
court decision was made. Further, the Memorandum Decision that was submitted does not 
necessitate, nor is there any rule in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, requiring Respondent to first object to the court's ruling, which he heard 
for the first time by a Memorandum Decision, in writing, pursuant to Rule 52 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, in order to request that this court review the issue of correctness of decision 
and for an abusive discretion on appeal. Further, the Respondent is incorrect in her Reply 
Brief where she states, "On Appeal, he [the Petitioner] has made no claim of plain error, or 
otherwise justified this court's consideration of this issue for the first time on appeal." Clearly, 
the Respondent has confused the standard under which this appeal is being taken. The 
standard under which this is being taken is an abusive discretion, not plain error. Were the 
Petitioner to have sufficiently detailed findings, then the Petitioner might be able to raise an 
issue of clear error. However, the findings being insufficient, that option has been foreclosed 
to Petitioner. Examples of questions of discretion, which a party may appeal from abuse of 
discretion, are as follows: whether or not a trial court had properly allocated marital debts for 
which it has broad discretion (see Hill v. Hill. 859 P.2d 963, 966-967 (Utah App. 1994); whether 
the trial court correctly determined the standard of living that existed during the parties' 
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marriage for purposes of calculating alimony (see Crompton v. Crompton. 888 P.2d 686, 689 
(Utah App. 1994); and how to determine the level of income for child support and alimony 
(see Griffith v. Griffith. 985 P.2d 255 (Utah 1999). 
Examples of challenging the trial court's decision based upon the clearly erroneous 
standard are as follows: Determining whether or not one spouse has waiver her right to reduce 
alimony payments (see Hinckley v. Hinckley. 815 P.2d 1352, 1354 (Utah App. 1991); and 
whether or not the trial court correctly applied the parties' incomes to the presumptive child 
support worksheet to correctly calculate child support. The difference between a clearly 
erroneous decision and a decision where there exists an abusive discretion is under the clearly 
erroneous standard the Court of Appeals is reviewing the trial courts' decision to determine 
whether or not it applied the facts of the case to the legal standards that are present. Under 
an abusive discretion, the appellate court is reviewing the trial court's decision to see whether 
or not the trial court went too far in its discretion away from the standards set or legally 
prescribed to it. The distinction is subtle, yet critical. As this case is an abusive discretion 
standard, we are determining whether or not the trial court applied and whether or not the trial 
court even remotely considered the legal standards that are used in making its determination 
in regard to imputation of income and calculation of alimony. We are not concerned, at this 
point, whether or not the trial court made a decision that was against the clear weight of the 
evidence, as we are not sure, based upon that court's decision, what evidence it even 
considered in making its determination. Furthermore, as stated in the Williamson case, supra, 
legally inadequate findings lower and even mitigate the appealing party's burden of marshaling 
the evidence, Williamson. 983 P.2d at 1105. 
An example of this abusive discretion is restated in the Respondent's Brief on Page 15 
where Respondent states: 
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Mr. Garlett's Exhibit 14, a Financial Declaration, listing his monthly net income at 
$2,154.00, his total monthly expenses at $2,586.12, and his monthly payments 
at $275.12, further demonstrates that the trial court acted well within its 
discretion in choosing not to rely his [sic] discretion in choosing not to rely on Mr. 
Garlett's assessment of his income. According to this document, Mr. Garlett 
was spending $707.24 per month more than he was making, without any 
provisions of his family-a position that is radically inconsistent with the Garlett 
family lifestyle. 
The trial court never explained, however, what expenses it considered appropriate for 
Petitioner in determining his ability to pay alimony. The Respondent states at length that 
evidence was put on by both parties to state that Petitioner's income could have been 
anywhere from $50,000.00 to $80,000.00 per year (R. 146 at 164). 
The trial court, in setting the Petitioner's expenses at $50,000.00 per year, is tacitly 
stating that this would be his gross income as gross pre-tax income is what is used by a court 
specifically in making a determination of child support. However, said child support being set 
at $50,000.00 year for Petitioner does not include his reasonable deductions for purposes of 
taxes and business expenses. The tax and business expense deductions are appropriate for 
making a determination of what his alimony figure should be. However, the court does not 
state what it is deducting for reasonable expenses for purposes of determining alimony, which 
by all rights it should have considering that Petitioner is obviously going to have to pay taxes 
on his court-ordered income of $50,000.00 per year, and he is also going to have to pay child 
support in at least some amount as well as pay his reasonable living expenses on a monthly 
basis. Instead, the trial court arrives at a round figure of $600.00 per month with no 
explanation as to how Petitioner is expected to pay this amount. The trial court is apparently 
aware of its duty to list expenses with at least a reasonable amount of specificity as it does in 
H4 of its Memorandum Decision: 
Jennifer is entitled to alimony. She will receive about $1,050.00 in child support. 
She will earn about $600.00 in take-home pay. She has demonstrated a need 
for $2,134.50 per month to cover expenses for herself and the children. 
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Alimony will be taxable to her. The court will award $600.00 per month alimony 
with the expectation that she will net $500.00 to cover her expenses. Chuck is 
able to pay this amount. If Jennifer and the children can live on $2,134.50 per 
month, Chuck can live on what remains as his monthly income after he pays 
$1,650.00 in child support and alimony. (Memorandum Decision at 4 and 5). 
(Emphasis added). 
The trial court fails, however, to establish what Petitioner's reasonable monthly expenses are. 
In fact, calculating that Petitioner will need at least similar amounts of money to live on every 
month, given that the purpose of alimony in a long-term marriage is to equalize the parties' 
standard of living, it is reasonable to assume that the Respondent will need at least $2,134.50 
per month to live on identical to the Petitioner. Given that the court has determined that 
Petitioner will have $4,166.00 per month pre-tax income with which to pay his expenses, it is 
reasonable to assume that he will be paying taxes on that which will amount to at least twenty-
six percent (26%) of that income, which leaves Petitioner $3,083.00 per month to live on. 
Subtracting from this amount the $1,650.00 in combined child support and alimony, Petitioner 
is left with $1,433.00 per month to live on, an amount far lower than the $2,134.50 that 
Respondent apparently needs to live on. 
The above analysis would be the basis for an appeal based upon a decision as clearly 
erroneous (where the law applied to the clear weight of the evidence does not warrant the 
decision arrived at by the trial court). However, the above argument is wholly speculative on 
the part of the Petitioner because the trial court failed to go through a similar analysis as above 
stated toward the Petitioner. Clearly, the trial court was aware of its ability, and at least 
partially aware, of its duty to perform this analysis, as it did so for the Respondent. Yet, 
somehow, the need for similar reasoning was lost as it applied to Petitioner. For that reason 
alone, the trial court's decision should be remanded for further findings consistent with the 
directives of the Court of Appeals. Once again, in citing Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877, 
881 (Utah App. 1995), "the trial court is required to enter detailed and specific findings on all 
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material issues," and in citing Hall v. Hall. 858 P.2d 1018, 1026 (Utah App. 1993),u. . . in 
determining whether to impute income due to other employment, the findings must address the 
clerical question of whether a drop in earnings was voluntary." 
Without belaboring a point, Petitioner feels it is necessary to emphasize the standards 
that this court has set forth in making alimony awards. "We uphold that the omission of a 
particular finding in alimony awards is an abusive discretion," Bird v. Bird, 799 P.2d 1167, 
1170 (Utah App. 1990), citing Ruhsam v. Ruhsam. 742 P.2d 123, 126 (Utah App. 1982). 
"Further, the trial court is required to enter sufficient findings on the enumerated Jones factors, 
and we will reverse if it fails to do so unless the relevant facts contained within the record are 
clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of judgment." 
Breinholt. 905 P.2d at 880 (citing Howell v. Howell. 806 P.2d 1209, 1213 (Utah App. 1991). 
Similar to Breinholt. both parties testified and submitted documentation for court regarding their 
stated monthly expenses. However, the trial court, in this case as in Breinholt. did not enter 
findings in regard to the reasonableness of the parties' expenses. While the trial court did 
state that $2,134.50 was a reasonable amount of expenses for Respondent, the trial court did 
not give any reasonable expenses which should be attributable to the Petitioner. As such, 
similar to Breinholt. the appellate court should remand so that we can determine if the court 
abused its discretion concerning the amount of the alimony award. The Respondent replies in 
her Brief, that "the business expenses of Mr. Garlett were not 'highly contested,' as were those 
in Breinholt v. Breinholt. 905 P.2d 877, 892 (Utah App. 1995), relied on at Page 12 in the 
opening Brief of Appellant. Rather, in the instant case, Mr. Garlett complains of the trial court's 
failure to make findings out of thin air-something no trial court is required to do." (Brief of 
Appellee, at Page 19). Respondent is clearly mistaken in this regard, as Petitioner is not 
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asking for the court to make findings of out thin air. Indeed, the Respondent submitted 
numerous bank statements and testified at great length at trial in regard to income. 
Additionally, both parties submitted proposed financial declarations and tax returns to 
the court at trial, which the trial court had in order to make a determination in regard to the 
parties' reasonable monthly expenses. The Respondent goes to great length to discuss the 
numerous trips taken by Respondent to Wyoming, Montana, Oregon, Las Vegas, Phoenix, 
Denver, New Mexico, and Cancun, and further to discuss the fact that Petitioner has had "six 
or seven guns worth around $1,500.00 and fishing tackle worth about $4,500.00 and took his 
bass fishing boat to Lake Powell." (See Brief of Appellee, at Page 18, and R.146 at 97-99 and 
R.146 at 73 and 74, 93). 
Given that the trial court held over its ruling to write a Memorandum Decision, one can 
only assume that the trial court had adequate time to consider the evidence that was before it. 
Given that it had taken the extra time to make the ruling via a Memorandum Decision instead 
of making a ruling from the bench that day, one can only assume that given the evidence 
before it, the trial court had adequate time to divine from the evidence what the parties' 
reasonable standards and monthly living expenses were. This is hardly consistent with the 
Appellee's claim that the trial court was being required to make expenses "out of thin air." 
The trial court's failure to do so can only be construed as an abuse of discretion for 
which this court should remand that the trial court enter more detailed findings in this regard 
and should hear, once again, the evidence provided by both parties in order to make an 
adequate determination of the parties' reasonable standards of living, monthly expenses, and 
other income-related issues. 
16 
POINT 2. PETITIONER ADEQUATELY PRESERVED FOR APPEAL THE ISSUES 
THAT IT WOULD HAVE THIS COURT REVIEW IN REGARD TO THE 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT. 
The Brief of Appellee states on Page 3, that "Are the findings underlying the alimony 
adequate? This case is governed by the differential abuse of discretion standard of review. . . 
. and further, it goes on to state because Mr. Garlett did not notify the trial court of the error 
claimed on appeal, despite having ample opportunity to do so, the issue is now preserved but 
for appeal." See, e.g., Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456, 458 (Utah App. 1990). Once again, the 
Respondent is confusing the clearly erroneous standard with the abuse of discretion standard. 
While the above-cited case states it stands for an abuse of discretion standard, the context in 
which Respondent would use said decision is more akin to a clearly erroneous standard. The 
Petitioner can only complain of the clearly erroneous decision of the trial court when he has 
the information necessary to make that complaint. The trial court, having failed to provide 
detailed and sufficient findings to support it legal conclusions, has left the Petitioner at a 
disadvantage in that regard. The Petitioner can only point out to the Court of Appeals that the 
findings are lacking in the support of the legal conclusions reached and request the trial court 
remand for review the decision of the trial court. 
Further, to state that the issue is not preserved for appeal because he failed to object 
to the clearly erroneous decision of the trial court would be to require the Petitioner to (1) 
assume the basis wholly on his own without any direction from the trial court upon which the 
trial court based its decision, and (2) then file an objection to the trial court within ten days of 
receiving its decision based upon findings which the Petitioner has had to himself at least 
partially create in order to file the objection itself. In this regard, preservation for appeal means 
that the Respondent brought all the relevant information before the trial court and the trial court 
failed to give detailed and sufficient findings in support of its decision based upon that 
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information. The Petitioner and Respondent gave to the trial court their financial declarations, 
tax returns and bank statements, and testimony regarding their income. The least that the trial 
court could have done was given adequate support for its finding that Petitioner has 
$50,000.00 a year income, list the expenses that the court considered persuasive in arriving at 
that income, and give an adequate basis for determining the Petitioner's standard of living so it 
could determined the Petitioner's ability to pay alimony to the Respondent. 
In Doe v. Hafen. the Respondent was requesting that the court overturn the decision of 
the trial court judge based upon, at least in part, the trial court judge's failure to ask a question 
in jury instructions to a jury which was in the judge's discretion to not ask. "Plaintiff did include 
one question in the series that may have, by itself, been proper. However, after the judge 
reviewed the whole series, Plaintiff made no attempt to call the judge's attention to that specific 
question. The party must make 'known to the court the action which he desires . . . or his 
objection to the action of the court and grounds therefore . . ." Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 46. This means to preserve a question for appeal, an objection must be clearly and 
concisely made in a "fashion calculated to obtain a ruling thereon." \d. at 458. It is misapplied 
to the case at bar, as this decision was given via Memorandum and no opportunity was given 
to Petitioner to make the objection on the record. 
Clearly, the Petitioner should not be barred from appealing the decision of the judge for 
failure to object to the judge's decision regarding alimony when the Petitioner cannot define 
from the judge's own ruling the basis for the decision in making this award of alimony in the 
first place. In short, the Respondent is once again trying to penalize the Petitioner for failure to 
make an objection based upon a clear and erroneous standard when the abusive discretion 
here involves failure to submit sufficient and detailed findings to support the legal conclusions 
of the trial court. 
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POINT 3. THE TRIAL DID ERR IN ATTRIBUTING TO THE PETITIONER INCOME 
IN EXCESS OF THAT FOUND IN HIS TAX RETURNS FOR PURPOSES 
OF CALCULATION OF HIS CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY. 
Respondent in her Brief of Appellee, goes to great length again to cite the Doe v. 
Hafen to argue that Petitioner has not preserved these issues for appeal Petitioner will not 
restate the arguments made above in controverting the position of the Respondent in that 
regard. Merely, for this court to the same arguments as have been previously stated in 
response to those allegations. In response to the allegations contained in the Brief of 
Appellee, on Page 31, wherein Appellee states: 
In point 3 of his Brief, Mr. Garlett asserts that his income should be assessed at 
$3,000.00 a month, because Mrs. Garlett testified that at times he can be very 
frugal, and may have lived on $18,000.00 in the first six months of the year. 
Assuming that Mr. Garlett spent $18,000.00 in six months does not account for 
a Seventeen Thousand Dollar loan the Knuths provided in that same time 
period, the home he was building for the Knuths without compensation, with the 
exception that he would later purchase the home from them at a very low cost, 
or reoay his labor if he could not buy the home, or otherwise refute the evidence 
concerning his earning history and capacity, and the wealthy lifestyle enjoyed by 
the Garlett family, discussed above, supra. 
The Brief of Appellee fails to point out that the money loaned to Petitioner by the 
Knuths was just that-a loan, for which the Knuths expect repayment and which Petitioner is 
obligated to repay. A loan should not be calculated as income, otherwise all parties who have 
credit cards should have their expenses on the credit cards counted as income for purposes of 
determining annual income. The fact that the trial court had this information before it and 
failed to factor it into their calculation of Petitioner's income further shows the lack of specificity 
in the court's findings. It goes to show the lack of attention that the trial court paid to 
establishing Respondent's reasonable monthly expenses, when he had, in fact, information not 
only regarding money that Petitioner earned but money that he borrowed in order to pay for his 
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monthly expenses. Further, the trial court fails to articulate in its decision what portion of those 
expenses is attributable to the home that Petitioner was building and what portion of those 
expenses was attributable to personal expenditures of the Petitioner. Further, on Page 32 of 
the Brief of Appellee, Appellee states: 
He [Petitioner] submitted Exhibit 14, financial declaration, listing his monthly net 
income at $2,154.00 and listing total monthly expenses at $2,586.12 and 
monthly payments at $275.12. According to this document, Mr. Garlett was 
spending $707.24 per month more than he was making without any provisions 
for his family-a position that is radically inconsistent with the Garlett family 
lifestyle. 
By her own statement, Respondent acknowledges impliedly that the trial court failed to 
adequate address Petitioner's lifestyle. This inconsistency, while not unusual for families going 
through divorces, has been only addressed by the Respondent in the Brief of Appellee and 
nowhere in the Record of Trial and nowhere in the Memorandum Decision of the trial court 
judge. Respondent's own analysis in her own appellate brief sheds more light on the 
expenses that the court may have considered by the Respondent than does the trial court. 
The entire paragraph quoted above is pure speculation on the part of the Respondent. The 
Respondent assumes that the trial court follows the above reasoning to figure out what 
Petitioner's income is, however, the trial court nowhere in any of its written documentation nor 
oral statements on the record indicates that this is the case. Once again, Respondent is 
engaging in the kind of speculation that requires this court remand for further review the 
decision of the trial court. 
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POINT 4. RESPONDENT SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED ATTORNEY'S FEES 
FOR RESPONDENT TO PETITIONER'S APPEAL, AS PETITIONER'S 
APPEAL HAS MERIT, PRESENTS LEGITIMATE QUESTIONS 
REGARDING SUFFICIENCY OF FINDINGS AND IS NOT SOUGHT 
FRIVOLOUSLY. 
This court should not award attorney's fees to Respondent upon appeal. "Ordinarily, 
with fees in a divorce that have been awarded to a party who then prevails on appeal, fees will 
also be awarded to that party on appeal." Watson v. Watson. 837 P.2d 1, 8 (Utah App. 1992) 
(quoting Bell v. Bell. 810 P.2d 489, 494 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting Burt v. Burt. 799 P.2d 1167, 
1171 (Utah App. 1990)). See also. Munz v. Munz. 790 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah App. 1990) (citing 
Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331, 1336 (Utah App. 1998). 
Respondent was not awarded fees in the case at bar in the lower court and should not 
be awarded fees on appeal, even if she prevails. Further, the Petitioner has met his burden of 
showing serious deficiencies in the ruling of the trial court and, thus, no frivolity is involved in 
his appeal. There are serious issues that the court needs to address and the misstatements of 
Respondent in her Brief, such as that "Mr. Garlett not only misidentifies the gender of the child 
whose family identity is in jeopardy, but also claims that his belated efforts to challenge the 
paternity of the child are justified by the need to test the 'natural father,' when no such tests 
were performed or required, or by trial counsel, in regards to his failure to follow through with 
non-existent plan to bastardize this child," are in no way true. The misidentification of the 
gender of the child is nothing but a clerical error and should in no way be used to demonstrate 
that Petitioner is in any way trying to request this court order the trial court to do anything but 
follow the law as stated before and as cited in the Brief of Appellant. The error in that regard is 
harmless and does substantively affect the analysis of any issues presented on appeal. 
Furthermore, the attempts on the part of Respondent to imply that Petitioner's attorney and the 
Petitioner himself should be sanctioned for appealing the decision of what can be called at 
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best a cursory analysis by the trial court, is itself merely inflammatory behavior with which the 
Respondent is seeking favor in the eyes of this Court and potentially fees with which to pay for 
her litigation, and is not meritorious in the case at bar. The Respondent states that Petitioner's 
Appeal is legally frivolous and filed for purposes of delay. (See Brief of Appellee, Page 37). 
Given that Petitioner is now paying both his child support and alimony obligations regularly and 
that the Respondent is enjoying possession of the home and custody of all the parties' minor 
children, and receiving financial support for those children, it is hardly meritorious to say that 
the Petitioner's Appeal of the lower court's decision is delaying any relief that is currently being 
enjoyed by Respondent. 
CONCLUSION 
The court should remand the trial court's ruling for further findings in regard to the 
above-stated issues and should deny the Respondent's Rule 33 request for an award of 
attorney's fees. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ?< day of /\A&fLLV 2002. 
CORPORON & WILLIAiy£ 
x- ^ 
l\MRY£.-CORP6RON 
, JARROD H. JENNINGS 
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RULING ON MOTION FOR 
NEW TRIAL 
Case No. 9947-167 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
Petitioner Charles S. Garlett ("Charles") has moved for a 
new trial, asserting the discovery of evidence that he is not the 
father of one of the children. That motion is supported by no 
affidavit. Respondent Jennifer T. Garlett ("Jennifer") has 
submitted a verified response asserting that Charles was well 
aware of the possibility - or even probability - that he was not 
the father of one of the children. Charles has submitted no 
reply, nor any affidavit supporting his assertion that the 
evidence is newly discovered. 
The motion for new trial is denied. Because the motion 
has so little merit, the court exercises its discretion in 
domestic relations cases to award Jennifer her fees in responding 
to the motion. Counsel for Jennifer should submit an affidavit 
with her proposed order pursuant to Rule 4-504. 
Dated this _
 w^~ • day of October, -2000. . 
Lyle R. Anderson, District Judge 
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